Seminarios de Economía
Los Seminarios de Economía se realizan semanalmente y presentan investigaciones de frontera a cargo de especialistas nacionales e internacionales. Su objetivo es promover el intercambio académico, fortalecer redes de colaboración y contribuir al debate y la generación de conocimiento. Los seminarios son abiertos al público y pueden seguirse de forma presencial o por Teams. Para solicitar el enlace de acceso, escribir a economia@um.edu.uy.
The Economics Department Seminar Series is held weekly and features cutting-edge research presented by leading national and international scholars. Its goal is to foster academic exchange, strengthen collaborative networks, and contribute to informed debate and the advancement of knowledge. The seminars are open to the public and can be attended either in person or via Microsoft Teams. To request the access link, please contact economia@um.edu.uy.
Información
Detalles del seminario próximamente.
Abstract
Addressing the large inefficiencies generated by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? The leading approach is to ask individuals if they consent to waive their priority ex-ante. However, we show that consent-based mechanisms may not return an efficient allocation even when one exists that respects unwaived priorities, and that any mechanism in this framework is subject to this problem if consenting is harmless. We develop an alternative solution, in which a priority violation is justifiable whenever the affected student either i) directly benefits from the improvement, or ii) is unimprovable under any assignment that Pareto-dominates DA. This endogenous criterion permits improvements unattainable under any consent structure. The set of justifiable improvements is non-empty whenever DA is inefficient, and an essentially unique and strongly justifiable improvement can be found with a “just-below-cutoffs” mechanism. Building on it, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that returns justifiable improvements over DA that cannot be Pareto-improved without expanding the set of beneficiaries, by sequentially building admissible priority violations. Simulations show that our proposed mechanism frequently achieves fully efficient improvements and creates a large number of beneficiaries.
About the speaker
Pablo Arribillaga es Profesor del Departamento de Matemática de la Universidad Nacional de San Luis e Investigador Asistente del CONICET. Obtuvo su Doctorado en Matemática en la Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Su investigación se centra en teoría de juegos, elección social y optimización.
Abstract
In recent years we have seen significant cases of individuals from wealthy families emerging as candidates for political office. However, there is little systematic literature addressing the determinants of the candidacy of some but not others amongst the wealthy. We build on the literature on social capital to cast light on this question, specifically the literature on the political effects of social club membership. We leverage the creation in 1882 of the Buenos Aires Jockey Club - Argentina’s most prominent elite social club for over the past century. Using a staggered synthetic difference in differences strategy, we find that family and individual membership in the Jockey Club is associated with a significant increase in the probability of running for and winning legislative office. As for the mechanism, we present evidence that Jockey Club membership resulted in greater centrality in marriage networks with other elite families; such connections were exceptionally useful for mobilizing voters in Argentina’s patronage-based elections.
About the speaker
Shanker Satyanath es profesor de Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de Nueva York (NYU). Obtuvo su doctorado en la Universidad de Columbia y ha publicado sus investigaciones en revistas como The American Economic Review, The Journal of Political Economy y The American Journal of Political Science.
Abstract
Non-compliance with public regulations is a central challenge in many emerging and developing countries, especially during periods of crisis. We examine the political economy of deferred enforcement policies in the provision of basic services. Positioned between strict enforcement and forbearance, deferred enforcement allows indebted households to smooth repayment while preserving the credibility of future enforcement. We argue that this policy can induce compliance while offering political advantages to governments: in the medium run, by reducing fiscal risk, and in the short run, by sustaining access to essential services. We discuss the incentives, opportunities, and risks that deferred enforcement creates for governments, with particular attention to its political logic, and develop a micro-foundational framework to identify the conditions under which the policy is likely to achieve its intended effects. We then evaluate the compliance and political consequences of a deferred enforcement policy for electricity service implemented in Uruguay during the Covid-19 crisis using observational and experimental data. First, using a difference-in-differences design, we compare payment behavior and political attitudes among indebted, non-poor households that benefited from the policy and comparable households that did not. We find that deferred enforcement increases payment of the electricity bill and repayment of outstanding debt by 41 percentage points among beneficiaries. At the same time, we find no significant political effects. Second, using information nudges targeted to beneficiaries, we provide causal evidence on the mechanisms through a randomized controlled trial implemented in collaboration with the public electricity provider. Intent-to-treat estimates show a robust and substantively meaningful increase in payment in response to these nudges. Taken together, our findings show that deferred enforcement can be an effective strategy for governments in middle-income countries seeking to cushion the short-term effects of large shocks without incurring the fiscal—and therefore political—risks associated with forbearance.
About the speaker
Santiago López Cariboni es profesor titular en el Departamento de Economía (dECON) de la Universidad de la República. Obtuvo su doctorado en Ciencia Política en la Universidad de Essex y su investigación se centra en economía política internacional y comparada. Ha publicado sus investigaciones en revistas como Comparative Political Studies, The Review of International Organizations y Politics & Society.
Abstract
Models of political economy often assume the existence of gripped agents – citizens who vote against norm-violating politicians regardless of continuation payoffs. However, the motivational foundations of such behaviour remain unexplained. We consider two potential behavioural foundations: social preferences, in particular inequality aversion, and bounded rationality, in particular level-k reasoning. We find that inequality aversion provides a more robust foundation for the emergence of gripped behaviour. We then examine how inequality-averse gripped agents influence political outcomes in a probabilistic voting model where politicians redistribute resources through public goods provision. The model implies that inequality aversion shapes politicians’ optimal provision of public goods relative to purely self-interested settings, and that rent-extraction through corruption increases with redistributive concerns. These results link individual motives for redistribution to broader political economy outcomes (viz., corruption and inefficiently high public goods provision).
About the speaker
José Rivero es Profesor Investigador de Alta Dedicación en el Departamento de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad Católica del Uruguay. Es Magíster en Economía Internacional por la Universidad de la República y cuenta con una Maestría en Teoría Económica y Econometría por la Toulouse School of Economics. Obtuvo su Doctorado en Ciencias Económicas en THEMA (Théorie Économique, Modélisation et Applications) de CY Cergy Paris Université.
Abstract
This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender’s disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing, bilateral trade with interdependent values, insurance contracting, and policy negotiations. Across these settings, the sender is worst off if she reveals her type completely: if her type becomes known, the receiver can adjust the terms of trade to extract her surplus. Taking this feature as our central departure from the literature, we characterize the entire set of equilibrium payoffs across these disclosure games. We establish an equivalence result: every payoff profile that can be achieved through information design can also be approximated by an equilibrium of the disclosure game. Thus, hard information enables the sender to attain her commitment payoff without having to commit to an information structure. Moreover, this result highlights how verifiability can empower the sender in settings in which bargaining power resides with the receiver.
About the speaker
Kun Zhang es profesor asistente en la School of Economics de la Universidad de Queensland. Obtuvo su doctorado en Economía en la Arizona State University en 2023. Su investigación se centra en teoría microeconómica — en particular, diseño de mecanismos y comunicación — y organización industrial. Sus trabajos han sido publicados en el Journal of Economic Theory y en el American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Abstract
We study a diagnostic agency problem in which information acquisition is costly, centrally financed, and privately consumed, creating incentives for agents to over-acquire diagnostic information. Motivated by centralized healthcare, we consider a physician who chooses diagnostic tests and then makes a binary treatment decision. A designer values decision accuracy net of testing costs and can intervene either by controlling treatment decisions (ex-post distortions) or by designing the information structure (information design). When the designer can regulate only the total amount of diagnostic information, but not the composition of tests, the optimal mechanism distorts ex-post treatment decisions: treatment approval requires stronger evidence when more tests are ordered. By contrast, if the designer can fully control the diagnostic information, it is optimal to delegate treatment to the physician as long as reductions in false positives and false negatives are sufficiently close cost substitutes.
About the speaker
Juan S. Pereyra es profesor asociado de la Universidad de Montevideo. Obtuvo su doctorado en Economía en El Colegio de México. Su investigación se centra en teoría económica, con énfasis en diseño de mecanismos y diseño de mercados. Ha publicado en revistas como Theoretical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior y Journal of Theoretical Politics.
Abstract
We investigate the impact of judges' gender on the outcome of domestic violence cases. Using data from São Paulo, Brazil, between 2011 and 2019, the study finds that cases assigned to female judges are more likely to result in conviction than comparable cases assigned to male judges.
About the speaker
Vítor Possebom es Profesor Asistente en la São Paulo School of Economics - Fundação Getulio Vargas. Es Doctor en Economía por la Universidad de Yale y se especializa en Microeconometría Teórica y Aplicada.
Abstract
School absenteeism and disengagement remain persistent challenges in secondary education in Uruguay. Over half of young people aged 21–23 have not completed secondary school, and students in lower secondary education accumulate, on average, more than 30 absences per year. This study evaluates the impact of a behavioral intervention designed to improve attendance in the first year of secondary school, a critical transition point in students’ educational trajectories. The intervention leverages salience by sending brief, personalized WhatsApp messages to families with timely information on students’ accumulated absences, key academic dates, and insufficient grades. We assess the program through a clustered randomized controlled trial involving 255 public secondary schools and more than 30,000 students nationwide. We find that assignment to the treatment reduces absenteeism by 7%, equivalent to 2.2 fewer days absent per academic year. Instrumental variable estimates indicate a larger effect of 3.4 fewer days among students attending schools that effectively implemented the program. We complement the impact evaluation with process evidence to explore the mechanisms underlying these effects. Results suggest that the intervention operates primarily by reducing informational frictions between schools and families and increasing the salience of attendance information at critical moments, rather than by shifting underlying beliefs about absenteeism. These findings highlight the potential of low-cost, scalable behavioral interventions to strengthen family engagement and reduce absenteeism in secondary education, particularly in contexts with high risks of educational disengagement.
About the speakers
Lucía Rosich ocupa el cargo de Investigadora del Laboratorio de Ciencias Comportamentales de Ceibal. Es Licenciada y Magíster en Economía por la Universidad de la República, y actualmente cursa un Doctorado en Economía en la Universidad Nacional del Sur. Desde su incorporación a Ceibal, ha participado en el diseño, seguimiento y evaluación de intervenciones basadas en ciencias del comportamiento aplicadas al ámbito educativo. Cuenta con experiencia en análisis de datos cuantitativos y cualitativos, y ha trabajado con diversas metodologías, incluyendo análisis de redes y minería de texto.
Guillermina Suárez ocupa el cargo de Jefa del Laboratorio de Ciencias Comportamentales de Ceibal. Es Licenciada y Magíster en Economía por la Universidad de la República y Magíster en Economía Comportamental por Evidentia University of Behavioral and Forensic Sciences. Lidera un equipo enfocado en la aplicación de las ciencias del comportamiento en contextos educativos, trabajando en el diseño, implementación y evaluación de intervenciones orientadas a generar evidencia para informar y mejorar políticas públicas. Cuenta con experiencia en análisis de datos, experimentación en campo y evaluación de impacto, combinando ciencias del comportamiento, métodos experimentales y diseño de políticas en contextos reales.
Abstract
Economic models typically treat health production technologies as objective and commonly understood. In practice, people may act on subjective perceptions of these technologies shaped by cultural and religious beliefs. We study whether prayer responds to changes in objective disease risk in a manner consistent with economic optimization. During the COVID-19 pandemic, most US adults believed that prayer was effective against COVID-19 and prayed in order to keep themselves safe. We incorporate prayer into a simple health production framework and exploit staggered vaccine eligibility as a source of variation in the effective price of protection. Vaccine eligibility reduces prayer as well as avoidance (the use of masks and social distancing), indicating substitution across perceived health inputs. Consistent with inframarginality, strongly religious people show no response while weakly religious people reduce prayer by 27 percent. These findings suggest that religious practices respond to objective risk in ways that mirror standard economic substitution.
About the speaker
Daniel Bennett es Profesor Asociado (de Investigación) de Economía en la Universidad del Sur de California, donde está afiliado al Centro de Investigación Económica y Social y al Departamento de Economía.
Su investigación se centra en el desarrollo económico y la salud global en Asia del Sur y el África austral. Sus trabajos recientes analizan el impacto económico de los problemas de salud mental en la India y las consecuencias de la epidemia de VIH/sida en el África subsahariana. Otras líneas de investigación abordan la religión y la salud, el saneamiento y la higiene, y la organización de los mercados farmacéuticos. Tiene experiencia en el diseño de encuestas, la recolección de datos primarios y la implementación de ensayos aleatorizados.
Sus estudios han aparecido en las principales revistas de economía, entre ellas la American Economic Review y la Review of Economic Studies, y han contado con financiamiento de los Institutos Nacionales de Salud, la Fundación Nacional de Ciencias y J-PAL. Obtuvo su doctorado en la Universidad Brown en 2008 y antes de incorporarse a la USC fue profesor en la Universidad de Chicago.
Abstract
Researchers and policy analysts routinely rely on race to characterize social inequalities in official statistics and survey data. An active debate asks whether race classification itself might respond to those very inequalities – as subjects and interviewers internalize social hierarchies in place. This paper provides first-hand evidence on the features of racial classification during childhood and adolescence. Drawing on longitudinal school census data, we start by documenting that racial fluidity is in the same range of that within the adult population (Study 1). Since census data relies on school reports, using novel data from a representative survey of Brazilian K–12 schools that uniquely collects student race reported both by schools and by students themselves, we further document that self- and school-reported race disagree for 34.5% of students in the country (Study 2). Strikingly, this is not because adults are more ‘objective’ (e.g., because of racial literacy or socialization); rather, relative to self-reports, schools ‘whiten’ students who read or do math proficiently while ‘darkening’ those falling behind or those affected by sensory and motor disabilities (Study 3). Reporting biases are not only sizable, but also, consequential: while non-white students are 56% more likely to exhibit functional disabilities based on school-reported race, there is no disproportional representation based on students’ self-reports; similarly, if non-white students are 20% more likely to experience reading delays based on school reports, they are actually 1/3 less likely to read below grade level based on self-reported race (Study 4).
About the speaker
Guilherme Lichand es profesor asistente de Educación en Stanford, codirector del Stanford Lemann Center for Entrepreneurship and Educational Innovation in Brazil, y miembro afiliado en el Stanford King Center for Global Development, el Stanford Center on Early Childhood, el Stanford Institute for Advancing Just Societies, y el UC Berkeley Center for Effective Global Action. Tiene un PhD en Political Economy and Government de la Universidad de Harvard. Guilherme fue reconocido por la Fundación Schwab y el diario Folha de São Paulo como uno de los diez principales emprendedores sociales de Brasil (legado pospandemia), en 2020, y por MIT Technology Review como el principal innovador social de Brasil entre emprendedores menores de 35 años, en 2014. También es experto en innovación social en la World Economic Forum Expert Network.
Abstract
In 2015, the Swedish National Police began publishing an internal list of “troubled neighbourhoods,” shaping public discourse and increasing negative media coverage despite no accompanying policy changes. Using a regression discontinuity design, we estimate the causal effect of neighbourhood listing on criminal justice outcomes by comparing defendants awaiting trial at the time of release with those sentenced just prior. Sentence lengths increased by over 60% (approximately 260 days) for defendants sentenced after listing updates. The effect is immediate, fades with media attention, and is strongest in courts where fewer judges have lived in these neighbourhoods. Affected defendants also experience a 16 percentage point decline in employment over the three years following sentencing. Using data on the full universe of court cases, we apply machine learning to analyse judicial reasoning and find that judges place less emphasis on legal detail and evidentiary complexity for affected defendants. These findings are consistent with limited-attention models in which salient public narratives influence decisions.
About the speaker
Magdalena Domínguez es economista investigadora sénior en el Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS, Londres), donde trabaja en el programa Transforming Justice. Es doctora en Economía por la Universitat de Barcelona (2021), magíster en Economía por la Universitat Pompeu Fabra (2017) y licenciada en Economía por la Universidad de la República (2014). Su investigación se centra en la economía del crimen, el análisis de redes y políticas públicas. Ha estudiado el funcionamiento de grupos de crimen organizado, políticas de base territorial y el funcionamiento del sistema judicial. Ha publicado en revistas como el American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, y ha colaborado con investigadores en Reino Unido, Suecia, España y Brasil.
Abstract
Much of what is known about well-being, health, trust, job satisfaction, and other subjective outcomes across countries relies on self-reported data collected through rating scales. Yet such comparisons implicitly assume that respondents interpret and use these scales in the same way. If scale use differs systematically, observed differences may reflect reporting conventions rather than underlying evaluations. This paper uses a dataset of more than four million hotel reviews in which guests from over 100 countries evaluate identical rooms to recover country-specific reporting functions. The results reveal substantial cross-country heterogeneity in scale use. To summarize this variation, we introduce two indices capturing stringency and moderateness. These indices correlate with socioeconomic and cultural characteristics and predict a broad range of self-reported country-level outcomes, including life satisfaction, trust, perceived security, and relationship evaluations. The findings suggest that systematic differences in scale use affect cross-country comparisons of subjective outcomes.
About the speaker
Mateo Seré es Profesor Asistente de Economía en la University of Montevideo e investigador afiliado en University College London y la University of Antwerp. Tiene una Maestría en Investigación en Economía y Econometría de la Université libre de Bruxelles y un PhD en Economía de la University of Antwerp, y realizó un posdoctorado en University College London. Su investigación se centra en mercados laborales, innovación y desigualdad, combinando econometría con machine learning, análisis de texto y métodos de big data.
Abstract
Artificial intelligence has arrived in every part of student life, yet most students use only a fraction of what it offers, and many rely on it in ways that quietly weaken the very abilities they came to university to build. AI at Your Side is written for the student who wants the opposite: to think more clearly, learn more deeply, and do more ambitious work with AI as a partner rather than a crutch.
Its argument is simple and consistent. Artificial intelligence should augment human intelligence, not replace it. Used carelessly, AI lets a student produce polished work while understanding very little. Used well, it lets that same student learn faster, get feedback sooner, and concentrate effort on the parts of intellectual life that matter most. The difference is not the tool but the way of working, and that is what this book teaches.
At its center is a practical idea the authors call a harness: a set of rules, routines, and constraints that keep an AI model focused, honest about what it does not know, and accountable to the reasoning it is meant to serve. Chapter by chapter, the book builds discipline-specific harnesses for the real work students do, from ideation, research, and academic writing to mathematics, coding, data analysis, economics, and finance.
Written by a senior research economist who has taught AI-integrated university courses and a member of the first generation educated alongside generative AI, the book is grounded in learning science and trains a single durable habit of mind: to ask what is missing, which assumption is doing the work, and what would change if it no longer held. Throughout, the goal is intellectual ownership, so that whatever you produce with AI at your side, the thinking remains unmistakably yours.
About the speaker
Sebastián Galiani es Weatherhead Presidential Chair en Economía de la Universidad de Tulane. Obtuvo su doctorado en la Universidad de Oxford y es fellow del NBER y de BREAD. Entre 2017 y 2018 se desempeñó como Secretario de Política Económica en el Ministerio de Hacienda de Argentina. Su investigación ha sido publicada en revistas como American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy y Quarterly Journal of Economics, y ha sido difundida por medios como Science, The New York Times y The Economist. Ha asesorado al Banco Mundial, al Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, a la Gates Foundation y a las Naciones Unidas.
Abstract
We study the dynamics of networks when agents experience fear of missing out (FOMO): using a popular product imposes negative externalities on those who abstain. We incorporate FOMO into a model of network externalities with timing frictions. FOMO can create product market traps, where agents consume a good they would collectively prefer not to exist. Some traps may still be constrained efficient. When the economy is trapped, large restrictions on use improve welfare, while small ones may reduce it. We show how experimental results can be mapped to our model and find that TikTok and Instagram are in inefficient equilibria.
About the speaker
Ana Elisa Pereira es Profesora Asociada y Vicedecana Académica en la Universidad de los Andes, Chile. Su investigación se centra en temas de teoría económica aplicada, economía de la información y economía financiera. Es graduada en Economía y en Música (Piano), Magíster en Desarrollo Económico, y tiene un PhD en Economía por la Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV.
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Market Power and Insurance Coverage
Fecha/Date: 13 de marzo/March 13th
Expositor/Speaker: Humberto Moreira
Afiliación/Affiliation: FGV- Río de Janeiro
International Equity Flows, Monetary Policy, and Time Consistency
Fecha/Date: 3 de abril/April 3rd
Expositor/Speaker: Javier Bianchi
Afiliación/Affiliation: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Don't Stop Believing: Empowering Low SES Students Through Cognitive Behavioral Interventions
Fecha/Date: 10 de abril/April 10th
Expositor/Speaker: Juan Pereira
Afiliación/Affiliation: Brown University
When Competition and Labor Market Policy Collide: The Case of the Minimum Wage
Fecha/Date: 22 de mayo/May 22nd
Expositor/Speaker: Rodrigo González
Afiliación/Affiliation: Boston College
Cities, Productivity and Trade
Fecha/Date: 29 de mayo/May 29th
Expositor/Speaker: Alvaro García
Afiliación/Affiliation: Universidad de los Andes, Chile
Heterogeneous Preferences and School Segregation: Evidence from Middle School Choice in Uruguay
Fecha/Date: 5 de junio/June 5th
Expositor/Speaker: Ignacio Cabrera
Robustly Optimal Income Taxation
Fecha/Date: 12 de junio/June 12th
Expositor/Speaker: Maren Vairo
Afiliación/Affiliation: Princeton University
Integrating Equity and Productivity in Health Assessments
Fecha/Date: 29 de julio/July 29th
Expositor/Speaker: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
Afiliación/Affiliation: Universidad Pablo de Olavide, España/Spain
Global Identification of Dynamic Panel Models with Interactive Effects
Fecha/Date: 31 de julio/July 31st
Expositor/Speaker: Pablo Mones
Afiliación/Affiliation: Columbia University
Can Financial Disclosure Unlock Bolder Innovation?
Fecha/Date: 15 de agosto/August 15th
Expositor/Speaker: Felipe Cabezón
Afiliación/Affiliation: Virginia Tech
Environmental Regulation as a Driver of Structural Transformation: Evidence from São Paulo's Fire Ban
Fecha/Date: 4 de setiembre/September 4th
Expositor/Speaker: Francisco Costa
Afiliación/Affiliation: FGV São Paulo
Ancient Epics in the Television Age: Mass Media, Identity, and the Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India
Fecha/Date: 11 de setiembre/September 11th
Expositor/Speaker: Alessandro Saia
Afiliación/Affiliation: Università di Bologna
Bilateral Monopoly Revisited: Price Formation, Efficiency and Countervailing Powers
Fecha/Date: 18 de setiembre/September 18th
Expositor/Speaker: Flavio Toxvaerd
Afiliación/Affiliation: University of Cambridge
Information Effects of Monetary Policy on Bond Yields in Emerging Markets
Fecha/Date: 9 de octubre/October 9th
Expositor/Speaker: Giuliano Simoncelli
Afiliación/Affiliation: University of Maryland
Minimum Wages and the Distribution of the Firm Wage Premia
Fecha/Date: 16 de octubre/October 16th
Expositor/Speaker: Marcelo Bergolo
Afiliación/Affiliation: UDELAR
How Redundant Information Can Help Overcome Bias
Fecha/Date: 6 de noviembre/November 6th
Expositor/Speaker: Francisco Silva
Afiliación/Affiliation: Deakin University
Beyond Patent Ownership: Learning About Technological Usefulness
Fecha/Date: 13 de noviembre/November 13th
Expositor/Speaker: Rory Mullen
Afiliación/Affiliation: Warwick University
The Hidden Cost of Oil: Infant Health and Industrial Pollution
Fecha/Date: 4 de diciembre/December 4th
Expositor/Speaker: Matías Brum
Afiliación/Affiliation: Universidad ORT Uruguay
Smog and Safety Checks: A Case for Monopoly Delegation
Fecha/Date: 10 de diciembre/December 10th
Expositor/Speaker: Juan Pablo Montero
Afiliación/Affiliation: PUC Chile
One Battle After Another: Union Busting as Strategic Deterrence
Fecha/Date: 18 de diciembre/December 18th
Expositor/Speaker: Agustín Barboza
Afiliación/Affiliation: Princeton University
Título: Calling All Parents: Leveraging Behavioral Insights to Boost Early Childhood Outcomes in the Developing World
Fecha: 14 de marzo
Expositor: Juanita Bloomfield
Afiliación: UM
Título: Peer effects in Mental Health
Fecha: 4 de abril
Expositor: Ana Balsa
Afiliación: UM
Título: Beefing Up the Service Sector:Commodity Exports to China and Production Network Spillovers
Fecha: 16 de abril
Expositor: Giorgio Chiovelli
Afiliación: UM
Título: How Labels and Vouchers Shape Unconditional Cash Transfers? Experimental Evidence from Georgia
Fecha: 2 de mayo
Expositor: Miguel Ángel Borella Mas
Afiliación: Universidad de Navarra
Título: Marco Legal e Incentivos de los Prestadores del Seguro Social de Salud (FONASA) en Uruguay
Fecha: 9 de mayo
Expositor: Ana Balsa y Juan Dubra
Afiliación: UM
Título: Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology
Fecha: 16 de mayo
Expositor: Nikhil Awardal
Afiliación: MIT
Título: "Is the output growth rate in NIPA a welfare measure?"
Fecha: 20 de mayo
Expositor: Omar Licandro
Afiliación: University of Leicester
Título: Greens from peers: The differential impact of technology spillovers on environmental performance
Fecha: 23 de mayo
Expositor: Horacio Rousseau
Afiliación: Florida State University
Título: Identification using Revealed Preferences in Linearly Separable Models
Fecha: 24 de junio
Expositor: Paulo Somaini
Afiliación: Stanford Business School
Título: Market power pass-through to prices and wages: evidence from Uruguay
Fecha: 27 de junio
Expositor: Nestor Gandelman
Afiliación: ORT
Título: Unveiling Procurement Manipulation: Regulatory Thresholds in a Middle-Income Country
Fecha: 8 de agosto
Expositor: Rodrigo Ceni
Afiliación: Lecon, Udelar
Título: Search and Information in Centralized School Choice Systems
Fecha: 15 de agosto
Expositor: Juan Escobar
Afiliación: Universidad de Chile
Título: School Effects on College Outcomes in the Absence of Standardized Tests: The Role of Reputation vs Effectiveness
Fecha: 29 de agosto
Expositor: Román Zárate
Afiliación: Universidad de Toronto
Título: Can fear change our beliefs?
Fecha: 12 de setiembre
Expositor: Lucía Freira
Afiliación: Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Título: Narratives and Market Exchange in Developing Countries
Fecha: 26 de setiembre
Expositor: Juan Pedro Ronconi
Afiliación: Universidad de los Andes
Título: Household job search and labor supply of secondary earners
Fecha: 3 de octubre
Expositor: Renata Narita
Afiliación: PUC-Rio Economics
Título: Local non-bossiness and preferences over colleagues
Fecha: 17 de octubre
Expositor: Juan Pereyra
Afiliación: UM
Título: Why Do Apology Laws Fail?
Fecha: 24 de octubre
Expositor: Luis Frones
Afiliación: Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Udelar
Título: Climate Changes Affect Human Capital
Fecha: 7 de noviembre
Expositor: Germán Caruso
Afiliación: Banco Mundial
Título: Does Performance Evidence Motivate? A Field Experiment in Guinea-Bissau’s Health Sector
Fecha: 21 de noviembre
Expositor: Mattia Fracchia
Afiliación: IE Business School
Título: Synthetic anchoring under the source problem
Fecha: 5 de diciembre
Expositor: Federico Veneri
Afiliación: Iowa State University
Título: Riot Networks and the Tullock Paradox: An application to the Egyptian Arab Spring
Fecha: 9 de febrero
Expositor: Fernando Vega Redondo
Afiliación: Universidad Carlos III
Título: Supply Chain Resilience: Evidence from Indian Firms
Fecha: 6 de marzo
Expositor: Nicolás Morales
Afiliación: Banco de la Reserva Federal de Richmond
Título: Teaching Teachers to Use Computer Assisted Learning for Facilitating Personalized Learning at Scale: Experimental and Non-Experimental Evidence
Fecha: 16 de marzo
Expositor: Philip Oreopoulos
Afiliación: University of Toronto
Título: Geographical Expansion in US Banking: A Structural Evaluation
Fecha: 11 de mayo
Expositor: Juan Morelli
Afiliación: Board of Governors of the FRS
Título: Rooftop solar panels and (more) batteries
Fecha: 25 de mayo
Expositor: Natalia d'Agosti
Afiliación: University of Edinburgh
Título: Private colonialism in Africa
Fecha: 1º de junio
Expositor: Giorgio Chiovelli
Afiliación: Universidad de Montevideo
Título: A Discussion of Vintage Optimization Models in Forest Economics
Fecha: 8 de junio
Expositor: Adriana Piazza
Afiliación: De la FEN-U Chile
Título: Crop Choice and Groundwater Optimal Price
Fecha: 22 de junio
Expositor: Facundo Danza
Afiliación: Universidad ORT
Título: Search Costs, Biased Beliefs and School Choice under Endogenous Consideration Sets
Fecha: 4 de julio
Expositor: Chris Neilson
Afiliación: Yale University
Título: Stochastic Compliance and Identification of Treatment Effects
Fecha: 6 de julio
Expositor: Juan Pantano
Afiliación: University of Arizona
Título: Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps
Fecha: 27 de julio
Expositor: Federico Echenique
Afiliación: UC Berkeley
Título: Firms’ Rollover Risk and Macroeconomic Dynamics
Fecha: 3 de agosto
Expositor: Rafael Guntín
Afiliación: University of Rochester
Título: Strategic incentives and the optimal sale of information
Fecha: 10 de agosto
Expositor: Rosina Rodríguez
Afiliación: University of Bonn
Título: Market power and firm-to-firm productivity pass-through
Fecha: 15 de agosto
Expositor: Lucía Casal
Afiliación: Cornell University
Título: Regulation by Public Options: Evidence from Pension Funds
Fecha: 17 de agosto
Expositor: Sebastián Fleitas
Afiliación: Universidad de Lovaine
Título: Small children, big problems? Childbirth and crime
Fecha: 24 de agosto
Expositor: Breno Sampaio
Afiliación: Universidad de Pernambuco
Título: Director Networks and Misconduct
Fecha: 31 de agosto
Expositor: Matías Braun
Afiliación: ESE - Universidad de Los Andes
Título: Information about corruption and politicians' proposals
Fecha: 7 de setiembre
Expositor: Guillermo Lezama
Afiliación: ESE - University of Pittsburgh
Título: Procedural decision making in the face of complexity
Fecha: 14 de setiembre
Expositor: Gonzalo Arrieta
Afiliación: Stanford University
Título: Unemployment insurance when the wealth distribution matters
Fecha: 28 de setiembre
Expositor: Hernán Ruffo
Afiliación: Universidad Torcuatto di Tella
Título: Income Inequality and Firms in Latin America
Fecha: 3 de octubre
Expositor: Marcela Eslava
Afiliación: Universidad de Los Andes
Título: The exchange rate as an industrial policy
Fecha: 23 de octubre
Expositor: Diego Pérez
Afiliación: NYU
Título: TBA
Fecha: 14 de diciembre
Expositor: Juan Pablo Xandri
Afiliación: Universidad de los Andes, Chile
Título: Carbon Taxes, Air Pollution, and Individual Mortality
Fecha: 24 de marzo
Expositor: Juan Odriozola
Afiliación: Arizona State University
Título: The Other Great Migration: Southern Whites and the New Right
Fecha: 7 de abril
Expositor: Martin Fiszbein
Afiliación: Boston University
Título: Bank Risk Governance
Fecha: 21 de abril
Expositor: Dietmar Leisen
Afiliación Johannes Gutenberg University and UNSW-Sydney Business School
Título: Legalizing harmful drugs: Government participation and optimal policies
Fecha: 28 de abril
Expositor: Rodrigo Arnabal
Afiliación: Banco Central del Uruguay
Título: Identification of Marginal Treatment Effects without an exclusion variable
Fecha: 5 de mayo
Expositor: Santiago Acerenza
Afiliación: ORT
Título: Private Colonialism in Africa
Fecha: 2 de junio
Expositor: Giorgio Chiovelli
Afiliación: UM
Título: Can blind processes prevent the wage gap? Experimental evidence.
Fecha: 9 de junio
Expositor: Santiago García-Couto
Afiliación: Georgetown, Qatar
Título: A Quantitative Model of High Cost Consumer Credit
Fecha: 16 de junio
Expositor: Joaquín Saldain
Afiliación: University of Virginia
Título: Estimating Industry Conduct in Differentiated Product Markets: the Evolution of Pricing Behavior in the RTE Cereal Industry
Fecha: 23 de junio
Expositor: José Paz y Miño
Afiliación: Universidad Católica del Uruguay (UCU)
Título: Lowering Barriers to Remote Education: Experimental Impact on Parental Responses and Learning
Fecha: 30 de junio
Expositor: Laia Navarro-Sola
Afiliación: Stockholm University
Título: The Effect of High Dismissal Protection on Bureaucratic Turnover and Productivity
Fecha: 21 de julio
Expositor: María Lombardi
Afiliación: Universidad Torcuatto di Tela
Título: Understanding Consumption: Learning by Trying
Fecha: 28 de julio
Expositor: Julio Garín
Afiliación: Claremont McKenna College
Título: The Intertemporal Effects of Seeing Prices: Evidence from Garbled Offers in Malawi
Fecha: 11 de agosto
Expositor: Guilherme Lichand
Afiliación: University of Zurich
Título: Political Alignment and Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation: Evidence from Crime in Mexico
Fecha: 15 de setiembre
Expositor: Emilio Depetris
Afiliación: PUC Chile
Título: Internal seminar
Fecha: 20 de octubre
Expositor: Joaquín Passeyro
Afiliación: Universidades Toscanas
Título: Cooperation and Competition: The Case of Innovation in the Telecommunications sector
Fecha: 27 de octubre
Expositor: Tatiana Rosa
Afiliación: PUC Chile
Título: Accountability Under Polarization
Fecha: 10 de noviembre
Expositor: Horacio Larreguy
Afiliación: ITAM
Título: Monetary Values of Changes in Body Mass Index: Do Spouses Have a Role?
Fecha: 17 de noviembre
Expositor: Tinna Aisgerdottir
Afiliación: University of Iceland
Título: Brothers votes for Brothers: The Effects of Pentecostal Political Influence in Brazil
Fecha: 24 de noviembre
Expositor: Daniela Solá
Afiliación: CEMFI
Título: Land Quality
Fecha: 8 de diciembre
Expositor: David Weil
Afiliación: Brown University
Título: Early Release from Prison on Electronic Monitoring and Recidivism: A Tale of Two Discontinuities
Fecha: 15 de diciembre
Expositor: Olivier Marie
Afiliación: Erasmus School of Economics
Título: Ventajas comparativas reveladas en disciplinas científicas y tecnológicas en Uruguay
Fecha: 15 de abril
Expositor: Néstor Gandelman
Afiliación: Universidad ORT
Título: Information frictions, partial defaults, and sovereign spreads
Fecha: 22 de abril
Expositor: Juan Morelli
Afiliación: Fed Board of Governors
Título: The gendered division of paid and domestic work under lockdown
Fecha: 6 de mayo
Expositor: Monica Costa Dias
Afiliación: University College London
Título: Apart but Connected: Online Tutoring and Student Outcomes during the COVID-19 Pandemic
Fecha: 13 de mayo
Expositor: Michela Carlana
Afiliación: Harvard University
Título: Impact Investing and the Fostering of Business Ventures' Financial Performance and Social Impact in Disadvantaged Urban Areas
Fecha: 20 de mayo
Expositor: Caroline Flammer
Afiliación: Boston University
Título: Forced Displacement, Human Capital and Occupational Choice
Fecha: 27 de mayo
Expositor: Giorgio Chiovelli
Afiliación: Universidad de Montevideo
Título: Labor Market Power, Self-employment, and Development
Fecha: 3 de junio
Expositor: Francesco Amodio
Afiliación: McGill University
Título: Incentives and Burnout: Dynamic Compensation Design With E§ort Cost Spillover
Fecha: 10 de junio
Expositor: Juan Dubra
Afiliación: UM
Título: Inmigration, Crime an Crime Misperceptions
Fecha: 24 de Junio
Expositor: Nicolás Ajzenman
Afiliación: EESP-FGV
Título: Do Firms Cater to Investor Demand for Environmental and Social Responsibility?
Fecha: 15 de julio
Expositor: Stuart Gillan
Afiliación: University of North Texas
Título: Cheating with Models
Fecha: 22 de julio
Expositor: Ran Spiegler
Afiliación: University College London
Título: Internal seminar
Fecha: 29 de Julio
Expositor: Daniel Ferrés
Afiliación: UM
Título: Liquidity and Risk in Search Markets: A Theory of Asset Prices and Trading Volumes
Fecha: 2 de Septiembre
Expositor: Juan Passadore
Afiliación: Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Título: Texting Parents about Early Child Development
Fecha: 9 de Septiembre
Expositor: Karen Macours
Afiliación: Paris School of Economics (INRAE)
Título: The Oportunistic, the Indifferent and the Angry: they effect of Temperature on Crime
Fecha: 30 de setiembre
Expositor: Emiliano Tealde
Afiliación: UCU
Título: TBA
Fecha: 18 de octubre
Expositor: Jan Eeckhout
Afiliación: Pompeu Fabra
Título: TBA
Fecha: 25 de octubre
Expositor: Noma Katzkowicz
Afiliación: Lecon
Título: Ask a local: Improving public pricing in urban Tanzania
Fecha: 2 de diciembre
Expositor: Tanner Regan
Afiliación: London School of Economics
Título: Indoor Air Quality and Learning: Evidence From a Large Field Study in Primary Schools
Fecha: 16 de diciembre
Expositor: Nicolás Durán
Afiliación: UCL's Bartlett Real Estate Institute
Título: Insider Trading in Price Fixing Firms
Fecha: 31 de enero
Expositor: Harold Contreras
Afiliación: Universidad de Chile
Título: Sell-Side Analyst Heterogeneity and Insider Trading
Fecha: 13 de febrero
Expositor: Francisco Marcet
Afiliación: FEN - Universidad de Chile
Título: Belief-Elicitation when more than money matters
Fecha: 20 de febrero
Expositor: Juan Dubra
Afiliación: UM
Título: Small incentives may have large effects: the impact of a price on the quantity of plastic bags used
Fecha: 12 de marzo
Expositor: Marcelo Caffera
Afiliación: UM
Título: The Effects of Elementary School Instructional Time on Medium Term Schooling and Labor Market Outcomes
Fecha: 19 de marzo
Expositor: Alina Machado
Afiliación: Lecon
Título: Optimal Management of an Epidemic: Lockdown, Vaccine, and Value of Life
Fecha: 7 de mayo
Expositor: Rody Manuelli
Afiliación: Washington University in St Louis
Título: A Multi-Risk SIR Model with Optimally Targeted Lockdown*
Fecha: 14 de mayo
Expositor: Ivan Werning
Afiliación: MIT
Título: The Behavioral SIR Model, with Applications to the Swine Flu and COVID-19 Pandemics
Fecha: 21 de mayo
Expositor: Lones Smith
Afiliación: University of Wisconsin
Título: Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages?Fecha: 28 de mayo
Expositor: Guido Lorenzoni
Afiliación: Northwestern University
Título: Bank-Runs, Contagion and Credit Easing
Fecha: 4 de junio
Expositor: Javier Bianchi
Afiliación: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Título: Reopening Under COVID-19: What to Watch For
Fecha: 11 de junio
Expositor: Jeff Harris
Afiliación: MIT
Título: Trabajo a Distancia y con Contacto en Uruguay
Fecha: 18 de junio
Expositor: Rafael Guntín
Afiliación: NYU
Título: The Micro-Anatomy of Macro-Consumption Adjustments
Fecha: 25 de junio
Expositor: Diego Pérez
Afiliación: NYU
Título: Covid-19 y la economía de los países emergentes: ¿Qué sabemos…hasta aquí?
Fecha: 16 de julio
Expositor: Carlos Winograd
Afiliación: Paris School of Economics
Título: How do Top Earners Respond to Taxation? Evidence from a Tax Reform in Uruguay
Fecha: 23 de julio
Expositor: Marcelo Bérgolo
Afiliación: IECON
Título: Directed Search over Poisson Point Processes
Fecha: 30 de julio
Expositor: Juan Xandri
Afiliación: Princeton University
Título: Belief-Dependent Pricing Decisions
Fecha: 13 de agosto
Expositor: Rodrigo Lluberas
Afiliación: Banco Central del Uruguay
Título: Healthy Kids and Working Moms: Evidence from Health Supply and Demand Shocks in Mexico
Fecha: 27 de agosto
Expositor: Pablo Celhay
Afiliación: PUC Chile
Título: An Inconvenient Fact: Private Equity Returns & The Billionaire Factory
Fecha: 3 de setiembre
Expositor: Ludovic Phalippou
Afiliación: University of Oxford
Título: Selection, Subsidies, and Welfare in Health Insurance: Employer Sponsored Health Insurance Versus the ACA Marketplaces
Fecha: 10 de setiembre
Expositor: Sebastián Fleitas
Afiliación: University of Leuven
Título: The Bank Business Model in the Post‑Covid‑19 World
Fecha: 17 de setiembre
Expositor: Xavier Vives
Afiliación: IESE Business School
Título: Cash and Crime
Fecha: 24 de setiembre
Expositor: Nestor Gandelman
Afiliación: Universidad ORT Uruguay
Título: The Quantitative Effects of Trade Policy on Industrial and Labor Location
Fecha: 1º de octubre
Expositor: Lorenzo Caliendo
Afiliación: Yale University
Título: Corporate Hiring under Covid-19: Worker Downskilling, Job Flexibility, and Income Inequality
Fecha: 8 de octubre
Expositor: Gaurav Kankanhalli
Afiliación: University of Pittsburgh
Título: Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Fecha: 29 de octubre
Expositor: Florian Ederer
Afiliación: Yale University
Título: Must-have items
Fecha: 5 de noviembre
Expositor: Juan Pablo Montero
Afiliación: PUC Chile
Título: The Asymmetric Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk
Fecha: 26 de noviembre
Expositor: Matías Moretti
Afiliación: NYU
Título: Bad Taste: Gender Discrimination in the Consumer Credit Market
Fecha: 21 de diciembre
Expositor: Raimundo Undurraga
Afiliación: Universidad de Chile
Título: Equilibrium Effects of Food Labeling Policies
Fecha: 23 de diciembre
Expositor: Nano Barahona
Afiliación: Stanford University